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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
EARL SAMPSON and LERLYNN C. 
SAMPSON, his wife; GULF OIL 
CORPORATION; FIRST STATE 
BANK OF SALINA, 
Defendants- Respondents. 
CASE NO. 14323 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in condemnation by the Utah State Road 
Commission to acquire 3. 21 acres of land located in Salina City, 
Sevier County, Utah for the purpose of constructing a portion of 
Interstate Highway 1-70. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on the issue of just compensation 
to be awarded for the taking and damaging of respondents' properties 
which resulted in a judgment on the verdict in the sum of $63, 000. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The State of Utah made a motion for a new trial which was denied 
by the trial judge. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
MR" stands for record. ,,TRM stands for transcript of record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The landowners, Earl Sampson and Lerlynn Sampson, his wife, 
long-time residents of Salina, Utah, acquired approximately seven 
acres of land and developed a dairy business upon said property in 
the year 1958 (TR. 40). This dairy was in continuous and full 
operation from 1958 until the date of condemnation. The property 
was fully fenced with steel posts, net fencing, and barbed wire and 
was located within the corporate limits of Salina City (TR 21, 22, 70, 71). 
There had been constructed upon the land various improvements 
consisting of a modern cinder block milking parlor, corrals, lounging 
sheds, pens, mangers, concrete pads, water troughs, and a concrete 
silage pit (TR. 21-40). At the date of taking the property was zoned 
residential, although it had a permissive use for dairy operation 
based upon its long existence (TR. 71>. A substantial protion of the 
property fronted on a hard-surfaced city street and was serviced by 
electricity, city culinary water, and city sewer system (TR. 21,22,67) 
(Exhibit P-i). 
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On November 1, 1974, the Utah Road Commission filed a com-
plaint in the District Court of Sevier County, State of Utah to condemn 
3.21 acres of the subject property for highway development (R. I); and 
the area of take ran approximately through the middle of the seven-
acre tract (TR. 40, 81, 82^ (Ex. P-l). Included in the area condemned 
were substantial portions of the corrals, lounging sheds, mangers, 
water troughs, concrete pads, bull pen, and fencing (TR. 40, 81, 83). 
As a consequence of the taking, the concrete silage pit and approximately 
one acre of land on the east side of the condemned parcel were severed 
and left in a'landlockecT condition (TR. 45, 94) (Ex. P-l). The dairy 
operation, of necessity, was terminated; and the remainder of the 
improvements located outside of the area of the taking were rendered 
useless and of no value (TR. 40, 45, 8l-83>. At the date of condemnation 
Mr. Sampson was maintaining a dairy herd of approximately fifty 
milking cows and fifty dry cows fTR. 70, 83>. 
The case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages and, in 
essence, the testimony relative to dollar amount illicited is summarized 
in the Statement of Facts set forth by the appellant in its brief. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict as 
follows: 
, f
. . . Market value of property taken by the State $16, 050 
-3-
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"Damages, if any, to remaining land and improvements 
by reason of severence „ A ^ J J ^ _ ~ 
."Total judgment . . i ? A £ ° £ . l f 
(R. 25). 
Appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial which, 
after argument, was denied by the trial judge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE GREATER 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The appellant concedes that the verdict of $46, 950 for severence 
damages is within the range of the "expert" testimony and does not 
challenge that portion of the verdict (Page 5 of Appellant's brief). 
An analysis of appellant's argument indicates that their position 
is predicated upon the theory that the testimony given by a property 
owner in a condemnation action is not competent evidence which can 
support a verdict; that only the testimony of an "expert" will support 
such a verdict, and that in the instant case there was no evidence 
other than that of the landowner to support the portion of the verdict 
dealing with the award rendered for market value of property taken. 
We do not and cannot agree with such a position in the light of the 
-4-
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evidence and applicable law. It would appear that appellant contends 
that the property owner should be extended the courtesy of telling 
the jury what he thinks his property is worth and what amount, if 
any, his properties have been damaged; but that if it should happen 
that a jury accepts such testimony, it should then be immediately 
withdrawn and the landowner advised that his testimony really carries 
no weight at all. 
At page 12 of appellant's brief, it is stated: /The fact that Mr. 
Sampson had been in the dairy business for a great number of years 
may have qualified him as an expert concerning the operation of the 
dairy, the cost of such an operation, the value Of and replacement 
cost of the milking parlor and other improvements... " (Emphasis 
added), yet they challenge this same witness' qualifications to testify 
relative to the value of the land upon which such improvements have 
been constructed, occupied, and maintained for nearly 17 years. If 
the landowner is admittedly qualified to testify as to the value of the 
improvements and knowledgeable on such matters of importance, 
how can appellants logically contend that the same witness is totally 
lacking in the qualification and knowledge relative to the value of the 
land upon which such improvements exist? 
• * . . 
Mr. Sampson testified that he had owned and operated the subject 
- 5 -
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land and dairy business since 1958 and gave detailed testimony relative 
to the nature and extent of the land and improvements with which we 
are concerned (TR. 21-44). in further support of the testimony which 
he gave concerning the value of his raw land, he testified that he had 
made inquiries of other property owners and had investigated other 
sales. He found that a parcel of land located immediately east and 
across the creek from his property had sold for $5, 000 per acre. 
This land had none of the amenities of sewer, water, or hard-surface 
streets, such as his property enjoyed, and had been previously used 
as an alfalfa farm (TR. 41, 42, 43, 52, 53). Such sale was further cor-
roborated by the expert witness for the landowner, who identified this 
sale as having occured in 1973 (TR. 75,76). 
It is of interest to note that with the exception of the aforementioned 
sale in 1973, none of the "expert" witnesses were able to find truly 
comparable sales and relied upon sales of agricultural land located 
primarily outside the city limits, with little or no utilities available 
(TR. 73-76, 125-127, 201-206). In one instance the Statefs witness, 
Mr. Adams, used as one of his comparable sales a parcel of land 
covered with salt grass, which had no sewer, water, or electricity 
and fronted on a gravel lane; and due to its location, was acquired 
by the City of Saiina as a site for a sewer lagoon (TR. 201-206). To 
-6-
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contend that the landowner's testimony has no weight and should be 
totally disregarded smacks of total absurdity when tested in the light 
of the comparable sales relied upon by the other witnesses. 
At page 5 and 6 of appellant's brief, it is stated that the land-
owner "testified that the land taken had a value of $60, 000." We 
believe this to be an obvious, unintentional error as nowhere in the 
record does such testimony exist. 
The total jury verdict was the same amount as the sum testified 
to by Memory Cain, expert appraiser for the landowners. 
At first glance, one might well assume that the jury arrived 
at this verdict of $63, 000 by adopting the testimony of Mr. Cain. 
However, upon a more careful analysis of the verdict, we find that 
the jury did not adopt the exact testimony of any witness with respect 
to the $46, 950 severance damages, but selected and arrived at that 
amount after careful deliberation, which sum was within the range 
of the expert testimony. One, by the same process of analysis, might 
assume that the jury arrived at its verdict for the value of the "property 
taken" by adopting one segment of Mr. Sampson's testimony. To do 
so would, in our opinion, be fraught with the same obvious unwarranted 
assumption and constitute an unwarranted invasion upon the rights of 
the jury, it is important to keep in m'irri that involved in the "taking" 
-7-
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was not only 3.21 acres of raw land but also a substantial portion of 
the improvements which consisted of corrals, lounging sheds, mangers, 
loading chutes, concrete slabs, water troughs, and fencing (Ex. P-l) 
(TR. 36, 45, 68-69, 83, 193). The expert testimony relative to the 
value placed upon the improvements taken, exclusive of land, ranged 
from a low of $2, 637 as testified to by State witness, Harry Dyson, 
(TR. 135), to a high of $12, 096 as testified to by State witness, Aldon 
Adams (TR. 185-194), with the landowner's expert witness at $4, 387 
(TR. 96-97). With such a variation and range of testimony, it is impos-
sible to say how the jury arrived at the figure of $16, 050 except by pure 
conjecture and speculation. 
Counsel for the appellant did not object to the landowner's 
testimony at the time of trial and cross-examined him in detail relative 
to his knowledge of the value of his land and improvements, thus giving 
the jury a full opportunity to weigh his testimony (TR. 50-57). 
This court has long recognized the principle that where there 
exists any reasonable combination of testimony to support a verdict, 
the same should not be disturbed. 
In the case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. 
Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253', 358 P. 2d 81, this court said: 
-8-
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M
.. .The jury was entitled to believe 
or disbelieve in part or in whole the 
testimony of the two appraisers. 
Regardless of how arrived at, the jury 
chose the 'before1 value of plaintiffs 
appraiser and the 'after' value of defen-
dants' appraiser. Presumptions and 
intendments cannot be indulged in to 
establish a contradiction or inconsis-
tency in the findings or answers of a 
jury to special interrogatories, the 
presumption being always to the con-
trary. And this court cannot go behind 
the answers and analyze or speculate 
as to the process by which the jury 
arrived at them." 
See also Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P. 2d 622 
89 C.J. S. Trial § 562, p. 324. 
This principle of law was again pronounced in the recent case 
of City of Tucson v. Gastelum, 541 P. 2d 590 (Ariz.-Oct. 1975) wherein 
that court said: 
" . . .There were no special interrogatories 
submitted to the jury. We do not know how it 
arrived at its estimate of severence damages. 
Appellant's calculations are sheer specu-
lation. Where the amount of damages or the 
value of property is concerned, and where 
witness pick varying sums as proper esti-
mates of damages or the value of the property 
the trial court and the jury are not bound to 
fix the verdict or judgment at the exact sum 
testified to by any one of the witnesses, es-
pecially when the conclusions are based upon 
many factors. They may instead take part 
of the necessary factors from the testimony 
-9-
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of one witness and part from that of 
another and reach a result anywhere 
between the highest and lowest esti-
mate which may be arrived at by using 
the value factors appearing in the tes-
timony. Any combination which is 
reasonable will be sustained by the 
trial court. M 
Appellant has cited the case of State Road Commission v. 
Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347, ostensibly to show that a 
litigant is bound by the testimony of "expert" witnesses only. Appel-
lant would like the Silliman case to say that an owner's testimony of 
damages in a condemnation case could never form the basis to support 
a jury's finding. However, in the Silliman case the verdict for sever-
ance damages exceeded the highest figure of any witness (including 
the landowner). This court held the verdict was therefore excessive 
"as a matter of law." It instructed that otherwise the verdict could 
not be set aside unless so excessive as to be shocking to one's con-
science. The Silliman case too presented a factual situation entirely 
different from the case at bar. 
The State Road Commission would like to have this court construe 
the ruling in the case of Utah State Road Commission v. The Steele 
Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975), to say that in ail condemnation actions 
a jury verdict cannot stand if it exceeds the highest "expert" testimony 
-10-
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and that the testimony of the landowner will not support such a verdict. 
A careful reading of The Steele Ranch case clearly distinguishes that 
case from the instant action and presents a factual situation substan-
tially different. At issue in Hie Steele Ranch case was the determination 
of the more sophisticated question of severance damages, an issue 
generally considered more complicated and difficult of ascertainment 
than a determination of damages resulting from a "take.ff Further-
more, there existed a lack of unity of title to the properties which 
were involved in The Steele Ranch case, which caused this court to 
comment: 
M
 .-.. • Along with the foregoing is to be 
considered a further difficulty; that the 
manner in which the case was submitted 
to the jury permitted them to appraise 
the severance damages, not only to the 
remainder of the ranch property but also 
the adverse effect upon the resident's 
property; . ." 
M
 . . . An view of the frailties we have dis-
cussed above concerning the evidence as 
to severence damages and the manner in 
which the jury was allowed to consider ft, 
I t is our conclusion that there is not alTu?~ 
ficiently sound foundation that the award 
of $75, 000 can fairly and justly be regarded 
as being supported by substantial evidence. M 
(Emphasis added) 
This court, in a'long line of cases, has consistently held with 
the great weight of authority that a landowner is a competent witness 
-11-
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to testify concerning the value of his property taken and damaged 
in an action under the law of eminent domain. See Salt Lake & U. R. 
Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90, 92 (1920); Provo River 
Water Users Assn. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777; State 
Road Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P. 2d 507. Similarly 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the right of a property 
owner to testify concerning the value of property which he occupies 
and operates. Teiluride Power Co. v. Williams, 164 F.2d 685 
(Tenth Circuit, 1947). See also San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit 
District v. McKeegan, 71 Cal Rptr. 204 (1968); State of New Mexico 
v. Chavez, 80 N. M. 394, 456 P. 2d 868, 870 (1969); United States v. 
3,698.63 Acres of Land, Burleigh, Emmons & Morton Counties, State 
of North Dakota, 416 F. 2d 65, 66 (Eighth Circuit 1969). 
It was observed in the Schramm case, Supra, that: 
"In cases like the one under consideration 
the qualification of witnesses to express an 
opinion as to market value necessarily is a 
question to be largely determined by the 
trial judge. If it is shown that the witness 
is competent to express an opinion as to 
values, no matter what the source of the 
qualifying information may be, he should 
be permitted to testify. The sources of the 
witnesses' information may vary according 
to the peculiar means of opportunity the 
witness has of forming an opinion and judging 
the premises all her life, and has been interested 
-12-
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and alert in making inquiry as to 
its value, may not be as well qual-
ified to speak as the banker, lawyer, 
or real estate man, having more or 
less to do with sales and transfers of 
real property. The means and extent 
of the knowledge of any witness may 
be gone into on cross-examination, 
and rebutted by the testimony of other 
competent witnesses, whose opinions 
may differ as to value. No rule can 
be formulated for determining the 
means by which a witness shall acquire 
the necessary knowledge to qualify him 
to speak that will apply in all cases, if, 
under all the circumstances, he was in 
a position to obtain knowledge and form 
a correct judgment as to values, whether 
or not buying, selling, leasing, or using 
the property for purposes for which it 
is adaptable is immaterial, so long as 
the jury is given the benefit of the facts 
upon which the opinion of the witness is 
based. M (citing authority) 
This issue was before the New Mexico Supreme Court in the 
case of State of New Mexico v. Chavez, 80 N. M. 394, 456 P. 2d 868, 
870. In adopting the rule permitting such testimony, the court stated: 
"Appellant concedes that the prevailing 
rule permits an owner to testify concerning 
the value of his land both before and after 
a taking by condemnation (citing authority), 
It argues, however, that because the rule 
has been stated as one of practical neces-
sity. ***we should adopt the rule followed 
by a minority of jurisdictions which denies 
the right of an owner to testify concerning 
the value of his property taken or damaged 
-13-
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by the sovereign through the use of eminent 
domain.***" 
In the Eighth Circuit Court case of United States v. 3,698.63 
Acres, Supra, the court upheld jury verdicts which were in excess 
of the values placed upon land by the landowner's own appraisers. 
One defendant obtained an award of $137, 500 after his expert witness 
testified to damages of only $128, 000. Another defendant obtained 
an award of $34, 500 as compared with his two experts' testimonies 
of $32, 500 and $31, 450. In both instances two landowners had testi-
fied to figures in excess of the awards. One landowner had testified 
that he arrived at his figures on the basis of M . . . mostly the use of 
the land--what it's worth to m e . . . " The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals said that, as a matter of law, it could not say that the owner1 s 
opinions on land value wholly lacked weight. 
In the Chavez case, Supra, the testimony of the landowner's 
sole expert witness was stricken; and an award of $25, 000 was upheld 
on the basis of a $35, 000 figure testified to by the landowner himself. 
In another case recently before this court, Utah State Road 
Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P. 2d 507, the precise 
issue was presented as exists in the instant case; and in ruling that 
matter, this court stated: 
-14-
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M
,. .Mr. Dillree, being an owner of the 
property together with his wife, was a 
competent witness as to the value of the 
property taken and as to the severance 
damages incurred. 
In the light of the foregoing authorities, the testimony and 
evidence adduced at the trial, there is no sound basis to hold that 
the jury verdict in the instant action is unsupported by competent 
and sufficient evidence and testimony, 
CONCLUSION 
A fundamental and basic factor to be considered in this matter 
is that the appellant filed a motion for new trial subsequent to the 
entry of the jury verdict. Judge Don V. Tibbs denied this motion. 
The trial judge, having heard all of the evidence and having 
observed the demeanor of the witnesses, is in a distinct advantageous 
position to make a proper ruling with respect to the sufficiency of 
the evidence, which is the only real issue and a matter particularly 
within the province of the trial judge. 
To contend that the verdict of the jury is not founded upon 
sufficient evidence is to challenge the factual findings of the jury 
and the trial judge. 
We respectfully submit that the verdict and judgment should 
be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
BRANT II. WALL 
Attorney for Respondents 
Suite 500, Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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